INTRODUCTION
In a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out class action, a group of retail store managers allege that their employer incorrectly classified them as exempt from laws mandating overtime wages. 1 After the class is certified, the employer attempts to derail the class action by showing that it properly classified the employees as managerial employees. To this end, the employer moves to serve interrogatories on the employees, seeking information about their job duties. The court permits the discovery, but more than half of the employees fail to respond. The employer is now prejudiced because it lacks information that is crucial for its defense. Accordingly, the employer moves to dismiss the nonresponsive absentees. However, if the court orders dismissal, the employees must either opt in by completing the discovery or be excluded. How can the court ameliorate the employer's prejudice without distorting the opt-out scheme of the Rule 23(b)(3) class action? 2 1. The facts described in this paragraph mirror the facts in Postcertification discovery of absentees is rarely used and is neither precluded nor endorsed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). 3 However, most courts have concluded that such discovery may be permissible where it is not being used to harass the absentees and the defendant cannot obtain the information from the class representative(s). 4 Yet, when such discovery is undertaken and some absentees fail to respond, courts are divided on whether and how to sanction the nonresponsive absentees. 5 In Part I, this Note explores group litigation procedure, the due process rights of absent members, and discovery sanctions. In so doing, Part I provides a background for understanding the arguments addressed in Part II.
Part II analyzes the decisions of courts that have dismissed nonresponsive absentees, courts that have declined to dismiss nonresponsive absentees, and courts that have imposed other sanctions on nonresponsive absentees. In Part III, this Note argues that courts should generally dismiss nonresponsive absentees without prejudice in opt-out actions, and with prejudice in opt-in actions.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: ALL ABOUT GROUP LITIGATION
This part provides the context for the conflict with an overview of the types of group litigation in which courts have ordered absent member discovery. First, Part I.A examines two types of federal group litigation: Rule 23 class actions and Fair Labor Standards Act 6 (FLSA) collective actions. Part I.B examines the procedure of state class actions. When discussing state class actions, Part I.B focuses on the procedures of California and Alaska, two states that have considered whether to dismiss nonresponsive absentees.
Next, Part I.C turns to a discussion of the due process rights of Rule 23 absentees, an issue that figures in plaintiffs' arguments against sanctioning nonresponsive members. Part I.D then examines when, how often, and in what types of cases federal and state courts have ordered absentee discovery. Part I concludes with an overview of federal and state discovery sanctions, many of which courts have considered imposing on absentees.
A. Federal Group Litigation: Rule 23 Class Actions and Fair Labor Standards Act Collective Actions
This section discusses Rule 23 class actions and FLSA class actions, two kinds of aggregate litigation in which courts have ordered discovery and ultimately sanctioned nonresponsive absentees. First, this section examines the history, procedural mechanisms, and policies behind Rule 23 class put pressure on repeat defendants to obey laws that might not otherwise be enforced. 20 Absent members have few duties in class action litigation because the named plaintiff actively participates in the litigation on behalf of the class. 21 For instance, absent members generally do not have to appear before court or hire counsel. 22 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, "an absent classaction plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may sit back and allow the litigation to run its course." 23 Rule 23 does not address the duties of absent members. 24 Thus, courts disagree about whether absent members should be subject to certain duties, such as the duty to answer discovery requests 25 and to be subject to counterclaims. 26 When making a decision about the duties of the absentees in a particular case, courts should consider the goals of the particular litigation. 27 Generally, courts should ensure that the absent members' rights are represented at each stage of the litigation. 28 Additionally, courts should seek to maintain the efficiency of class actions and judicial economy. 29 In Part I.D, this Note considers how courts have applied this analysis to absent member discovery.
A class action begins when the class representative files a complaint on behalf of a purported class. 30 The court then determines whether the class can be certified. 31 Because any judgment binds all absent members, 32 20. See Bone & Evans, supra note 15, at 1260 n.22 (explaining that individual plaintiffs' claims are too small to pursue in securities fraud and antitrust cases and thus some securities and antitrust laws would be underenforced without the class action mechanism). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 680 (1986) (noting that class actions carry a risk of overenforcement, because a fee-motivated plaintiffs' attorney might sue where a class member might be more concerned about the negative long-term impacts of the litigation).
21. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985) ; see also 1 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 7, § 1:5, at 12- 13 certifying a class of members with the same interests is critical. 33 Such a binding judgment would be unfair if the class members did not have common interests. 34 Accordingly, the Rule 23(a) requirements ensure that the class members have the same interests and that maintaining a class action is feasible. 35 Additionally, all class actions must satisfy the requirements of one of the three Rule 23(b) class types. 36 The Rule 23(b) requirements further ensure class cohesion by limiting the kinds of class actions that can be maintained. 37 The Rule 23(a) requirements are numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy. 38 Under the numerosity requirement, the class must be so large that it is impractical to join the claims of all the class members. 39 The commonality requirement ensures that questions of law or fact are common to the class. 40 To satisfy the typicality requirement, the claims of the class representative(s) must be typical of the claims of the absent members. 41 Finally, under the adequacy requirement, the named plaintiff must "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 42 As this Note will later discuss in Part I.C, adequacy is one of the mechanisms that protects absent members' due process rights. 43 After a class action meets the Rule 23(a) requirements, it must meet the requirements of either (b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3). 44 There are two subcategories of Rule 23(b)(1) class actions. 45 Both kinds of (b)(1) class actions are mandatory class actions, meaning that absent members cannot 33 . See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Bone & Evans, supra note 15, at 1261-62 (explaining that proper class certification is critical because judgment in a Rule 23 action precludes absent members from bringing their claims to court again).
34. Such a class action would violate due process requirements because the absent members' interests would not be represented in court. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940 48 These class actions are mandatory because allowing plaintiffs to sue individually would undermine the goal of reaching a consistent judgment. 49 Situations where a (b)(1)(A) class action can be maintained include individual suits concerning a riparian owner's rights and individual suits against a landowner regarding a nuisance. 50 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions are known as limited fund class actions. 51 These class actions are permitted where prosecuting individual claims would be dispositive of other individual claims. 52 However, in practice, Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions have been limited to cases that involve a finite recovery fund. 53 If class members sought relief from a finite fund individually, the fund could be drained, precluding or depleting recovery for other individuals. 54 Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class actions are mandatory because permitting individual suits would undermine the goal of fairly distributing the available funds. 55 Rule 23(b)(2) class actions are known as injunctive relief class actions. 56 In (b)(2) class actions, the defendant has acted or refused to act in a way that generally applies to the whole class, making declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate. 57 Like (b)(1) class actions, (b)(2) class actions are mandatory class actions. 58 Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, known as damages class actions, are appropriate where common issues predominate over individual issues, and using class action procedure is a superior way to fairly and efficiently adjudicate the dispute. 61 It is often less clear that class action treatment is appropriate in damages class actions than in mandatory class actions, because individual issues may be significant. 62 Accordingly, a (b)(3) class action must meet the predominance and superiority requirements. 63 When analyzing predominance, courts assess whether common questions predominate over individual questions. 64 In doing so, courts compare individual claims and defenses to common claims and defenses. 65 In deciding whether a class action is a superior method, the court must consider the members' interest in maintaining individual actions, whether and what kind of litigation has already been started by the class members, how desirable it is to maintain the claims in that particular forum, and the difficulties of managing the action. 66 Because damages class actions may be less cohesive than mandatory class actions, 67 damages class actions permit members to request exclusion from the class in a so-called "opt-out mechanism." 68 If an absent member is excluded from the class, any judgment in the action will not bind that member. 69 Additionally, (b)(3) absent members have the right to participate in the action by intervening in person or through an attorney. 70 Accordingly, courts must send "the best notice practicable" to the class members in clear and concise language. 71 After the class is certified, the court can consider the claims and defenses of the parties. 72 However, certification legitimizes the class, which puts pressure on the defendant to settle the claims. 73 CIVIL RULES 61 (1996) , available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/ lookup/rule23.pdf/$File/rule23.pdf).
possibility of an "all-or-nothing verdict" can be too risky, even if there is a low probability of a plaintiffs' verdict. 74 While class actions can be a useful aggregative device, class actions are often brought by "entrepreneurial" lawyers, carry a risk of unmanageability, and can skew the outcome of a trial. 75 Plaintiffs' class action attorneys are incentivized to act as entrepreneurs in their own interest, because they stand to gain large fees from the litigation and are not closely monitored by free rider absent members. 76 Because of the entrepreneurial nature of class actions, class actions are driven by attorney's fees rather than by the interests of the class. 77 Where a plaintiffs' attorney's interests are unaligned with the interests of the class, an attorney may act contrary to the interests of the class. 78 Further, when individual issues or damages play a prominent role in a class action, the action may become unmanageable. 79 Finally, by combining many claims into one litigation, class actions raise the stakes of the litigation for the defendant. 80 As such, class actions increase the chances that the defendant will be held liable. 81 2. Party Plaintiffs: Fair Labor Standards Act Collective Actions Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act allows an employee to bring an action on behalf of "similarly situated" employees against an employer for unpaid wages. 82 85 This means that the members must affirmatively consent to be included in the judgment. 86 The consenting members are known as "party plaintiffs." 87 Additionally, unlike Rule 23 class actions, discovery of FLSA members is a regular occurrence. 88 The FLSA was enacted in 1938 to combat substandard workplace conditions that were detrimental to the health and well-being of workers. 89 Among other reforms, the FLSA set a minimum wage and required overtime pay for work over forty hours a week. 90 . 92 Courts have split on § 216(b) certification procedure. 93 Section 216(b) itself does not provide any guidance on how to determine whether a group of employees is "similarly situated." 94 Most courts take an "ad hoc" twostep approach when deciding whether the employees are similarly situated, although a minority of courts apply Rule 23(a) requirements. 95 The two-step certification process involves taking an "ad hoc" look at whether the employees in the action are similarly situated. 96 In the first step, the court reviews the complaint and supporting affidavits to determine whether a group of similarly situated employees exists. 97 ). Because the first-step certification decision is based on pleadings and affidavits, the first-step certification that the complaint identifies a group of similarly situated employees, the class is conditionally certified. 98 Notice of the collective action is sent to the employees, and the employees must return the consent form to the court to be included in the action. 99 During the second step, the defendant employer ordinarily makes a motion to decertify the class, and the court reviews whether the members are similarly situated with more scrutiny. 100 The parties serve discovery on class members to determine whether the members are in fact similarly situated. 101 Unlike Rule 23 class actions, courts have broad discretion to order class-wide or representative sampling discovery of plaintiffs in FLSA collective actions. 102 In deciding whether the plaintiffs are similarly situated, the court can consider the employees' placement and locations, the employer's defenses against individual plaintiffs, and fairness and procedural considerations. 103 If the court finds that the plaintiffs are not similarly situated, the class is decertified and the plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice. 104 If the court finds that the plaintiffs are similarly situated, the named plaintiff(s) and the defendant proceed to the merits of the case. 105 Under the Rule 23(a) approach, the court determines whether the class is similarly situated by analyzing whether the class satisfies the 23(a) numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements. 106 At least one court has recognized that the opt-in mechanism of § 216(b) is contrary to the opt-out mechanism of Rule 23 class actions. 107 California uses Field Code class action procedure. 112 In the Field Code, class certification is based on the straightforward rule that "[W]hen the question is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or when the parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole." 113 Field Code procedure requires that there be an ascertainable class and interest in the common issues. 114 Alaska's class action certification procedure tracks federal Rule 23 class action certification procedure. 115 This section discusses the due process rights of absent members. Class counsel often invoke these rights when arguing that courts should not impose sanctions on nonresponsive members. 117 The due process clause provides that the government shall not deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 118 The due process clause guarantees notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 119 Pursuant to the guarantee of the opportunity to be heard, all Rule 23 absent members are entitled to adequate representation. 120 However, an absentee's right to notice varies according to the type of class action. 121 In mandatory class actions, notice of any class certification decision is not required; 122 in opt-out class actions, notice of any class certification decision is mandatory. 123 Class actions are an exception to the general rule that one cannot be bound by a judgment in a litigation to which one is not a party. 124 Because absent members do not actively participate in a class action, procedural mechanisms must ensure that the members' interests are protected. 125 The procedural mechanism of adequate representation ensures that absent members are bound by a judgment only where the named plaintiff adequately represents the class. 126 Consequently, the class representative must "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." 127 To fulfill this requirement, the class representative must not have interests that are incompatible with the interests of the absent members. 128 Additionally, the plaintiffs' attorney must be experienced and qualified to represent the absent members. 129 131 the court appoints class counsel after considering counsel's experience, knowledge of the law, resources, and work already done on the particular claims. 132 Rule 23(g) was enacted because class counsel is "often critically important to the successful handling of a class action." 133 In addition to the adequate representation requirement, absent members in (b)(3) class actions are protected by notice. 134 In (b)(1) and (b)(2) mandatory class actions, notice of a class certification decision is discretionary. 135 Because (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes are "homogeneous without any conflicting interests between the members of the class," a binding judgment is not unfair (provided that the absent members have been adequately represented). 136 The certification requirements of mandatory class actions make it less likely that there will be defenses or issues pertaining to individual members. 137 By contrast, notice is an essential part of the (b)(3) class action mechanism. 138 Because (b)(3) actions do not have as much class cohesion as (b)(1) and (b)(2) actions, notice is an additional procedural safeguard that protects the interests of (b)(3) members. 139 The notice must describe the action and the member's rights in the action. 140 Additionally, the notice must provide the member with an opportunity to be excluded from the class This section discusses when and how absent members may be subject to discovery in Rule 23 class actions, FLSA collective actions, and California and Alaska state class actions. Courts are in disagreement as to whether, and to what extent, Rule 23 absentees should be subject to postcertification discovery. 142 The FRCP does not address the duties of absent class members. 143 Rule 23(d) states that courts may make orders that are required to efficiently run a proceeding and protect absent members, but does not contemplate orders directed to absent members. 144 Therefore, courts disagree as to whether absentees can be required to respond to discovery requests. 145 Courts have considered this potential duty in light of the facts and goals of the particular litigation. 146 A majority of the courts that have reached the issue have concluded that discovery of absentee members is permissible under certain circumstances. 147 However, some courts have also noted that such discovery should not be allowed as a routine matter, because it is contrary to the general policy that absent members need not participate in a class action. 148 Courts have considered allowing discovery of absent members in all three kinds of Rule 23(b) class actions, FLSA collective actions, and state class actions. 149 158 Likely, defendants have not requested such discovery because the cost of the discovery would exceed any benefit that the defendant could obtain from the information. 159 When deciding whether to permit absent member discovery, courts consider whether the requested discovery is appropriate in that particular litigation, the defendant's need for the information, and the potential burden on the absent members. 160 Courts have granted discovery when the information relates to common issues, the requests are not unduly burdensome, and the requested information is unavailable from the representative parties. 161 Because only common questions are appropriately resolved in a class action, courts have routinely rejected postcertification discovery requests where they pertain solely to individual issues. 162 Courts have also rejected discovery requests where it is evident that the discovery requests are being used as a tactic to scare class members or to decrease the size of the class. 163 Additionally, courts have expressed concern about discovery requests that are overly complicated or technical. 164 Absent members argue that they have an interest in not actively participating in a class action, 165 not being unduly burdened by discovery, 166 and maintaining the efficiency of class actions. 167 Absentees argue that a defendant may use discovery as a tactic to harass absent members. 168 Such discovery may discourage a member from remaining in the class, or force a member to hire individual counsel to complete the request. 169 What is more, permitting absent member discovery undermines the efficiency and intent of Rule 23 class actions by, in effect, creating an optin procedure. 170 172 By ordering discovery, courts force members to affirmatively participate in, or opt into, the action. 173 Plaintiffs argue that this effectively transforms a class action into a "massive joinder" of many individual claims. 174 Defendants argue that they have an interest in obtaining information that may be necessary to prove a defense. 175 Defendants may seek discovery from absent members to obtain information to support an affirmative defense, 176 to prove that there is no claim, 177 or to prove that a class lacks interest in proceeding as a whole. 178 Additionally, absent member discovery may illuminate the scope of the litigation and provide information for negotiating a settlement. 179 Ironically, discovery of absent members may undermine the efficiency of Rule 23 in a way that disadvantages not only absent members, but also defendants. If a court orders discovery and some members do not respond, the court might dismiss the nonresponsive members. 180 If those nonresponsive members are excluded from the action but can later sue the defendant on the same claim, the defendant may be subject to repetitive individual litigation if it cannot reach settlements with those individual members. 181 In sum, absent member discovery could lead to a defendant being unable to obtain a "bill of peace." 182 Two Rule 23 cases, one permitting absentee discovery and the other denying it, illustrate how courts have grappled with the defendant's need for information and the absentees' interest in not being burdened. In Dellums v. Powell, 183 demonstrators who had been arrested while protesting the Vietnam War brought a Rule 23(b)(3) class action against the chief of the capitol police, claiming false arrest, false imprisonment, and Fourth Amendment violations. 184 At trial, absent members gave testimony that established that policemen beat the demonstrators while arresting them. 185 On appeal, Powell, the chief of police, argued that the testimony was improperly admitted because the FRCP did not permit discovery of absent members. 186 The D.C. Circuit surveyed case law pertaining to absentee discovery. 187 The court held that such discovery is permissible where the requests are related to common questions, are made in good faith and not unduly burdensome, and where the requested information is not available from the representatives themselves. 188 Further, the court noted that Powell had the names of all the class members and could readily serve discovery requests on the members. 189 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to admit the absent member testimony. 190 By contrast, in Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 191 a district court found that discovery of absent members is categorically impermissible. 192 In Wainwright, Georgia school boards brought a class action against milk companies, alleging that the milk companies fixed prices in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 193 The milk companies served interrogatories and document production requests on the school boards and then moved to compel the school boards to answer. 194 The district court denied the milk companies' motion and held that they would not be permitted to take discovery of the absent members. 195 The court reasoned that forcing the absentees to respond would undermine the efficiency of Rule 23, essentially making the class action a "massive joinder." 196 absent members are not parties under Rule 23 and, therefore, are not subject to party discovery rules. 197 Among the courts that have permitted discovery in Rule 23 class actions, there has been a split on the issue of which party should bear the cost. 198 Some courts have ordered the defendant to pay, 199 likely reasoning that the defendant requested the discovery and therefore should bear the costs. One court has ordered the defendant and plaintiffs' counsel to split costs, reasoning that the discovery benefitted both the plaintiff's case and the defendant's case. 200 While there has been dispute about whether to allow discovery of Rule 23 absentees, courts have generally agreed that discovery of FLSA collective action plaintiffs is permissible. 201 Unlike in Rule 23 class actions, FLSA plaintiffs have chosen to opt into the action; 202 accordingly, subjecting those plaintiffs to discovery raises fewer concerns of coercion. Additionally, the discovery phase is a crucial component in the second step of the two-step process, because it allows the court to assess whether the members are similarly situated with a higher level of scrutiny. 203 Similarly to courts considering Rule 23 absent member discovery, state courts also disagree on whether absent members can be subject to discovery in state class actions. 204 California state courts are the only state courts that have considered in multiple cases whether absentees should be subject to discovery. 205 In California state class actions, defendants are sometimes permitted to take discovery of absent members, but such discovery is not permitted as a matter of course. 206 Case law indicates that defendants in a California state class action have a due process right to discovery from 197. See id. (explaining that absent members cannot be parties, because absent members have the option of intervening or formally entering the class action). However, after the Supreme Court's decision in Devlin, it is clear that absent members can be parties. In that case, the Supreme Court held that an absent member can be a party for some purposes, depending on the procedural context of the litigation. absent members. 207 Therefore, absent members are not automatically immune from discovery requests. 208 However, California state courts find that discovery restrictions are necessary to maintain the effectiveness of the class action. 209 Accordingly, the defendant must prove that the interrogatories concern matters that are necessary to the trial of class issues, are not unduly burdensome on absentees, and will not foreseeably decrease the class size. 210 Alaska purposes: they are a specific deterrent to the noncompliant party, a general deterrent to others, and ensure that the noncompliant party will not benefit from his or her failure to respond. 218 However, courts must also take care to ensure that a sanction is warranted, particularly when imposing the harshest litigation-ending sanctions. 219 Litigation-ending sanctions are disfavored because they preclude resolution on the merits, thereby raising due process concerns. 220 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that a sanction must be fair and must be related to the claim that is at issue in the discovery order. 221 When deciding whether a sanction is fair, a court analyzes a noncompliant party's culpability and course of behavior in the particular case. 222 Given the fact-specific nature of sanction imposition, there is no rigid test that dictates whether or which sanctions should be imposed. 223 Rather, courts are free to consider a number of factors. 224 Courts have considered, among other factors, the willfulness and bad faith of the party in not complying with the order, 225 the prejudice to the opposing party, 226 whether lesser sanctions would be effective, 227 whether the noncompliant party was warned of the sanction, 228 and the policy favoring disposing of cases on the merits. 229 Under Rule 37(b), federal courts may impose the following sanctions, in ascending order of severity, for failure to comply with court ordered discovery: direct that facts related to matters in the discovery order be taken as established for the purposes of the action; prohibit the noncompliant party from presenting certain claims, defenses, or evidence; strike pleadings; stay proceedings until the discovery order is completed; dismiss the action; render a default judgment; or hold a party in contempt of court. 230 In addition to or instead of these sanctions, courts can order the noncompliant party and/or the attorney representing the noncompliant party to pay expenses caused by the noncompliance, unless such an award would be unjust. 231 An award of expenses may be unjust if other severe sanctions have already been imposed. 232 Under Rule 37(d), a court can impose Rule 37(b) sanctions and/or expenses when a party fails to attend its own deposition or answer interrogatories. 233 The Supreme Court has held that courts should not dismiss with prejudice when a party is unable to comply due to external factors. 234 However, dismissal may be warranted if a party has not complied due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault. 235 The Supreme Court has explained that when a party makes a good-faith effort to comply with discovery, due process concerns weigh against dismissing the action. 236 When dismissing a claim, a court can either dismiss the claim with prejudice or without prejudice. 237 Dismissal with prejudice extinguishes the party's claim forever; 238 on the other hand, dismissal without prejudice ends only the present litigation. 239 A party dismissed without prejudice may refile the same suit on the same claim. 240 A court can also exclude a noncompliant party from presenting evidence in support of a particular claim or defense. 241 This sanction is especially appropriate when the noncompliant party frustrated discovery or when the evidence obtained from discovery would be necessary to build a claim. 242 Most courts have excluded evidence only when the noncompliant party has acted in bad faith, or when the failure causes incurable prejudice because of the due process concerns raised by the lack of evidence. 243 Both California and Alaska state rules set forth discovery sanctions that mirror the discovery sanctions set forth in Rule 37. Under Alaska's Rule 37(b), a court can, among other sanctions, direct that facts be taken as established for the purposes of the litigation, prohibit a party from introducing evidence, strike out pleadings, or treat a party in contempt of court. 244 Similar to federal court powers, Alaska state courts can order the noncompliant party to pay costs and fees, unless the failure was justified or such an award would be unjust. 245 California's Code of Civil Procedure authorizes courts to impose discovery sanctions under five categories: monetary sanctions, issue sanctions, evidence sanctions, terminating sanctions, and contempt sanctions. 246 
FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A)-(E

II. HARSH PUNISHMENT OR FAIR GAME? SANCTIONING NONRESPONSIVE ABSENTEES
Part II discusses the decisions of courts that have considered whether, and how, to sanction absent members for failure to respond to postcertification discovery requests. First, this part explores the decisions of courts that have dismissed noncompliant members with prejudice and courts that have dismissed noncompliant members without prejudice. Next, it considers the reasoning of courts that have refused to dismiss noncompliant members. Finally, this part discusses the decisions of courts that have imposed lesser sanctions: exclusion of evidence, exclusion of new claims, and monetary sanctions.
Few courts have considered whether to impose discovery sanctions on absentees. 247 
A. Dismissal
Part II.A details the decisions of courts that have dismissed absent members for failure to respond to discovery requests. First, this section discusses the decisions of courts that have dismissed nonresponsive members with prejudice. Second, it discusses the decisions of courts that have dismissed nonresponsive members without prejudice. Finally, Part II.A explores the decisions of courts that have declined to dismiss nonresponsive members.
Extinguishing Absent Member Claims Forever:
Dismissal with Prejudice
Courts rarely invoke dismissal with prejudice. There are three leading cases in which courts have done so. 250 Out of those three cases, only one case is an opt-out class action; the other two cases are opt-in class actions. 251 Because opt-in absent members have affirmatively opted into the class, and thus are more like real parties, a failure to respond shows greater bad faith in opt-in class actions than it does in opt-out class actions. 252 The cases that order dismissal with prejudice reflect bad-faith misconduct on the part of the absent members. 253 acted in bad faith by refusing to respond to a questionnaire after they had already been in contact with class counsel. 258 In Brennan, the Seventh Circuit dismissed absent members with prejudice from a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out securities fraud class action. 259 The plaintiffs alleged that Midwestern United Life Insurance Co. committed securities fraud by aiding and abetting a securities dealer who never delivered the stock that the plaintiffs purchased. 260 The trial court had permitted the defendant to serve interrogatories on the absentees for two purposes: to determine the amount of each member's claim and to obtain information to prove that it was not liable. 261 Many members failed to respond, even after class counsel sent a reminder letter and two warning letters to the nonresponsive members. 262 Consequently, upon the defendant's motion, the district court dismissed the nonresponsive absentees with prejudice. 263 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, reasoning that dismissal with prejudice was a permissible sanction because it compels response. 264 However, the court recognized that dismissal of absent members is a "drastic" sanction; the members took no affirmative action and were represented by the named plaintiff, but their claims would be extinguished forever. 265 Yet the Seventh Circuit found that dismissal with prejudice was warranted because the noncompliant members ignored multiple warnings. 266 Two courts have dismissed absent members with prejudice in opt-in class actions. 267 In Hernandez, a district court held that nonresponsive members in a FLSA action can be dismissed with prejudice, but only after the members have been warned that noncompliance could result in dismissal. 268 The plaintiffs argued that the class members were improperly classified as store managers who were exempt from overtime pay. 269 After certification, the defendant served three interrogatories and four document requests on the absent members. 270 The requests sought information relating to the employees' resumes and job applications after working at Starbucks, as 258 well as any previous testimony about working for Starbucks. 271 Starbucks sought to use the evidence at trial and in support of its motion to decertify the class. 272 Out of 732 members, 376 members failed to respond for nearly a year despite three orders requesting a response. 273 The court decided to give the nonresponsive members a final written warning, but planned to dismiss the members with prejudice if they still failed to respond. 274 Like the Brennan court, the Hernandez court was influenced by the fact that the absent members refused to respond to three warnings. 275 The court found that the noncompliant members acted in willful bad faith when they failed to respond to the three court orders. 276 However, the Hernandez court distinguished opt-in FLSA actions from opt-out actions. 277 The court explained that the defendant is presumed to be prejudiced when opt-in absentees fail to respond to class wide discovery. 278 The court's finding of prejudice supported the court's finding that the members acted willfully and in bad faith. 279 In Estrada, pick-up and delivery drivers sought damages for unpaid labor expenses in a California state class action. 280 The plaintiffs claimed that they were improperly classified as independent contractors, and thus were entitled to repayment of expenses incurred during their work. 281 Functionally, Estrada was an opt-in class action because the absent members had to respond to a conditional certification questionnaire to be considered for inclusion in the class action. 282 After defining the class, the court ordered that another questionnaire be sent to the absent members. 283 The second questionnaire was intended to gather evidence relating to damages and the issue of whether the plaintiffs were employees or independent contractors. 284 Ultimately, the court dismissed with prejudice the members who did not respond to the second questionnaire. 285 271. See id. at *2. Starbucks requested information about the employees' subsequent job applications because it sought information about how the employees described their job duties.
272 Like the Brennan court and the Hernandez court, the Estrada court was influenced by the members' bad-faith refusal to respond. 286 The Estrada members' nonresponse was in bad faith because they had previously been in contact with class counsel when answering the conditional class certification questionnaire. 287 Additionally, like the Hernandez court, the Estrada court explicitly found that the members' willful refusal to respond prejudiced the defendant employer. 288 The defendant was prejudiced because the requested information directly involved the issues of the case. 289 Further, the members' refusal to respond deprived the employer of its due process right to discovery under California law. 290 
Giving Absent Members a Break: Dismissal Without Prejudice
This subsection analyzes the two leading decisions in which courts have ordered dismissal of absentees without prejudice. Both decisions reflect concern for the absent members' due process rights. 291 Showing concern for the noncompliant members' right to be heard, the Cruz court allowed individual members to continue with their claims by ordering dismissal without prejudice and tolling the statute of limitations. 292 The Cruz court ordered dismissal because the members acted in bad faith, there was prejudice to the defendant, and lesser sanctions would have been ineffective. 293 In his Brennan dissent, then-Judge John Paul Stevens argued that the nonresponsive absentees should be dismissed as a matter of procedure, because their interests diverged from the interests of the representative when they failed to respond to the interrogatories. 294 Thus, the nonresponsive members were not adequately represented, and the court lacked power to bind them in judgment. 295 In Cruz, a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out employment class action, the plaintiffs alleged that their employment status was improperly classified. 296 As a result, defendant Dollar Tree Stores failed to pay overtime wages and provide rest and meal breaks. 297 hours and job responsibilities. 298 After many class members failed to respond, the class members were mailed two letters warning of casedispositive sanctions. 299 Concerned with the right to be heard, the court dismissed the nonresponsive members without prejudice and tolled the statute of limitations as to those members. 300 Further, the Cruz court declined to dismiss members whose final warning letters were returned as undeliverable. 301 The court reasoned that dismissing these members would be unfair because they never had a final opportunity to respond. 302 The court used the Ninth Circuit's five-part test to assess whether a caseending sanction was warranted and then surveyed case law pertaining to absent member dismissal. 303 The court found that four of the five factorsthe public's interest in resolution, the court's need to manage its docket, prejudice to the defendant, and the effectiveness of lesser sanctionssupported dismissal. 304 The factor favoring the resolution of cases on the merits did not support dismissal. 305 Additionally, the Cruz court found that Brennan was persuasive authority in support of dismissal and that Wainwright was unpersuasive. 306 Following the reasoning of Brennan, the Cruz court found that Dollar Tree Stores did not use the interrogatories as a tactic to scare or confuse class members. 307 Further, the court ameliorated the due process problems that concerned the Wainwright court by allowing members to continue individually with their claims. 308 The Cruz court found that Dollar Tree Stores would be prejudiced if the nonresponsive members' claims were not dismissed. 309 Without the discovery responses, it would be difficult for Dollar Tree Stores to identify which class members best supported its case. 310 Accordingly, Dollar Tree Stores would be disadvantaged when determining which members to call as adverse or rebuttal witnesses. 311 Further, some of the outstanding discovery responses could potentially be useful to Dollar Tree Stores' experts. 312 Additionally, lesser sanctions would be ineffective. 313 Monetary sanctions would not ameliorate Dollar Tree Stores' prejudice and would be impossible to collect from absentees. 314 Claim preclusion of the discoveryrelated claims would be tantamount to dismissal, because the requested discovery concerned all of the members' claims. 315 Finally, the Cruz court found the absentees' behavior to be in bad faith. 316 The court noted that the Ninth Circuit has held that dismissal is justified only where the party's behavior has shown "willfulness, bad faith, and fault." 317 The nonresponsive members had acted in bad faith because they had ignored multiple warning letters. 318 In his Brennan dissent, then-Judge Stevens focused on the court's jurisdictional power to bind the absent members. 319 He argued that nonresponsive members should be excluded from the class because of their right to adequate representation. 320 Citing Hansberry v. Lee, 321 Judge Stevens explained that a litigant can represent absent parties only to the extent that the litigant and the absent parties' interests align. 322 Judge Stevens reasoned that the nonresponding absent members had some interest in not revealing the information requested in the interrogatories and that this interest put them outside the class represented by the named plaintiff. 323 examines whether sanctions lesser than dismissal can be appropriate and whether discovery requests coupled with a threat of dismissal can intimidate absent members. Then, it examines the bad-faith requirement. Finally, it considers whether dismissal of absent members creates an opt-in scheme.
Dismissal is one of the harshest sanctions because it is litigation ending. 325 Consequently, plaintiffs argue that courts should impose lesser sanctions on noncompliant members, if lesser sanctions are available. 326 In Cox v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 327 a Rule 23(b)(2) employment sex discrimination action, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the trial court's decision dismissing members who did not respond to interrogatories. 328 The Cox court found that the trial judge did not consider lesser sanctions, and stated that there is an abuse of discretion if lesser sanctions would have sufficed. 329 Similarly, in Wouters v. Martin County 330 an FLSA collective action brought by emergency medical service personnel to recover overtime pay, the Eleventh Circuit found that a lesser sanction was available and reversed the dismissal of noncompliant members. 331 At the trial level, the defendant had requested the award of attorney's fees to cover the cost of preparation for the motion to dismiss, but the trial court had dismissed the noncompliant plaintiffs instead. 332 Because a lesser sanction was available, dismissal was inappropriate. 333 Courts have shown concern that the threat of a sanction as severe as dismissal can intimidate class members. 334 A dismissal order can potentially reduce the class size and thereby undermine the Rule 23 policy that all members are included unless they request exclusion. 335 In Easton & Co. v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 336 a securities fraud class action, the district court expressed concern that members might be intimidated by an interrogatory request warning of potential dismissal sanctions. 337 Ultimately, the court permitted the defendant to serve discovery on the absentees. 338 However, the court ordered the defendant to redraft the interrogatory request to eliminate a warning of dismissal. 339 Similarly, in Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 340 a mandatory 23(b)(1) class action, the court stipulated that discovery would not be enforced with the threat of dismissal. 341 The court explained that it had a duty to protect absentees from harassment. 342 The Eleventh Circuit has declined to dismiss absentees when there is no showing of bad faith on the part of the absentees. 343 In both Cox and Wouters, the Eleventh Circuit held that dismissal requires a showing of willful bad faith. 344 In Cox, the Eleventh Circuit refused to affirm the trial court's dismissal order, because the trial court neglected to make a finding of bad faith. 345 Similarly, in Wouters, the court reversed the dismissal of the noncompliant members because there was no finding of bad faith by the trial court. 346 Plaintiffs argue that dismissing noncompliant members in an opt-out action creates an opt-in action, which reduces efficiency and is inconsistent with the policies of Rule 23. 347 As discussed in Part I, one of the purposes of Rule 23 is to enhance efficiency. 348 By encompassing all members who did not request exclusion, opt-out class actions decrease the number of actions that will be brought on the same claim. 349 Plaintiffs argue that requiring absent members to respond to discovery creates an opt-in action, because the members have to take an affirmative action to remain in the class. 350 Requiring such affirmative action is contrary to the allencompassing rationale of Rule 23. 351 In Cox, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that dismissal of noncompliant absentees is contrary to the opt-out scheme of Rule 23. 354 The Cox court noted that the Rule 23 advisory committee specifically rejected an opt-in approach. 355 Further, requiring an affirmative action may intimidate members, effectively "freezing" out their claims. 356 If absentees' claims are frozen, it follows that total class action damages awards will decrease (assuming that the members do not continue their claims individually). 357 Courts have also considered whether dismissal creates an opt-in scheme when deciding whether to permit discovery in the first place. 358 In Kline v. First Western Government Securities, Inc., 359 a securities fraud action, the court denied the defendant's motion to serve discovery on absentees. 360 The court explained that serving discovery and then filing a motion to dismiss nonresponsive members was a "back door" way to create an opt-in action. 361 By creating a choice between response or dismissal, such a scheme would force absentees to opt in or be excluded. 362 On the other hand, in Schwartz v. Celestial Seasonings, Inc., 363 a Rule 23(b)(3) securities class action, a district court permitted the defendant to serve discovery on absent members. 364 However, the court found that a potential motion to dismiss would create an opt-in class action, and therefore decided to make the questionnaire optional. 365 shown that few courts have considered imposing sanctions other than dismissal on absentees. Accordingly, this section discusses four leading cases in which courts considered imposing alternative sanctions. This section analyzes a decision affirming the exclusion of evidence, a decision excluding new claims, and two decisions discussing monetary sanctions.
B. Considering Other
Exclusion of Evidence
In International Seafoods of Alaska, Inc., the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed a trial court's order excluding any evidence provided by nonresponsive members. 366 In that case, a class of commercial salmon fishers alleged that the defendant fish buyer promised to pay a more competitive price on salmon than what it had actually paid. 367 The fish buyer served two interrogatories on absentees to determine what documents or statements the class members relied on in believing that the defendant owed them a higher price per pound. 368 When many members failed to respond, the fish buyer moved to dismiss the nonresponsive members without prejudice. 369 The trial court declined to dismiss the members, noting that dismissal is the harshest sanction. 370 Instead, the trial court limited the evidence that the plaintiffs could produce at trial to the evidence that was provided by the responding class members during discovery. 371 This precluded the noncompliant members from testifying or offering evidence at trial. 372 On appeal, the defendant argued that the sanction was meaningless, because the nonresponsive members were not participating in the case and thus were never going to offer evidence or testify. 373 At the same time, those members increase the contingency fee for plaintiffs' counsel because they would still be eligible for money damages. 374 The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude evidence. 375 The court recognized the noncompliant members' interest in not being unduly punished, citing Brennan. 376 However, the court also noted that a harsher sanction would have been within the judge's discretion. 377 
Estoppel of New Claims
In Arleth v. FMP Operating Co., 378 stockholders sued the issuing corporation and its successor in interest for securities fraud. 379 The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss absentees who failed to respond to interrogatories concerning evidence of reliance. 380 However, the court estopped the nonresponsive members from raising new claims or rights. 381 The court found that dismissal was an overly harsh sanction and that the defendants had not proven that this harsh sanction was warranted. 382 Further, the court explained that it had a duty to protect the absent members and to give them their day in court. 383 Yet, the court recognized the defendants' concern that the nonresponsive members might unfairly surprise the defendant by raising new claims after discovery had concluded. 384 Accordingly, the court estopped nonresponsive members from raising new claims or rights. 385 
Monetary Sanctions
In Wouters, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of noncompliant members after finding that a monetary sanction would have sufficed. 386 At the trial level, some members had failed to respond to a set of interrogatories. 387 Consequently, the defendant requested the award of attorney's fees for the cost of preparation of the motion to dismiss. 388 However, the trial court rejected the request and instead dismissed the noncompliant plaintiffs. 389 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with class counsel that the absent members' nonresponse did not prejudice the defendant. 390 After the interrogatories had been delivered, the defendant had deposed each class member and obtained full answers to the interrogatory questions. 391 The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court erred when it rejected the lesser sanction of attorney's fees and dismissed the noncompliant [Vol. 81 plaintiffs. 392 As such, the Eleventh Circuit implied that monetary sanctions would have been appropriate. Further, the court stated that the decision did not preclude the district court's ability to impose lesser sanctions against the plaintiff or plaintiffs' attorney. 393 By contrast, in Cruz, a district court found that monetary sanctions are neither feasible nor practical. 394 In that case, the court considered imposing monetary sanctions on nonresponsive absentees but decided that the monetary sanctions would be difficult to collect and would not lessen the prejudice to the defendant. 395 The Cruz court did not address the issue of monetary sanctions against class counsel. 396 III. DISCOVERING A BALANCE: SANCTIONS SHOULD DEPEND ON THE TYPE OF GROUP LITIGATION In Part III, this Note endorses a solution that combines the reasoning of Hernandez and Cruz. This solution best balances defendants' and plaintiffs' interests because it takes into account the type of class action, the degree of prejudice to the defendant, and the level of bad faith on the part of the absentees. Part III first sets guidelines for ordering discovery of absentees. Then, it describes the solution and assess problems with it. Finally, it addresses an implication of the solution.
A. Guidelines for Absentee Discovery
Postcertification discovery of absentee members should continue to be a rare occurrence in Rule 23 class actions and state class actions, because such discovery is contrary to the general policy that absentee members need not participate in class actions. 397 Courts should continue to assess whether discovery is warranted by analyzing whether the requested discovery is appropriate in that particular litigation, the defendant's need for the information, and the potential burden on the absent members. 398 Discovery requests are appropriate only where they relate to common issues and where the information is unavailable from the representative parties. 399 Absentee discovery in FLSA collective actions is common and is an exception to the general rule that courts should not order absentee discovery. 402 In FLSA collective actions, members are required to affirmatively opt in and discovery is a crucial component of the two-step process. 403 Accordingly, discovery requests are less suspect in these actions because the "party plaintiffs" are more like real parties. 404 Although courts have broad power to order discovery in FLSA cases, 405 courts should order discovery only to the extent necessary and should consider the burden on the party plaintiffs.
B. The Hernandez/Cruz Solution
By implementing these procedures, courts will rarely have to consider whether to sanction noncompliant absentees. However, if a court must reach this issue, the court should first send a warning to the absentees. 406 The warning should include a response deadline 407 and inform the noncompliant absentees of the possible range of sanctions for continued nonresponse. 408 While a warning might intimidate some members, 409 it also might encourage response. More importantly, though, a court-issued warning will alleviate or forestall due process problems by giving the absentees notice of potential sanctions, 410 while protecting their right to their day in court. 411 If the absentees still fail to respond after a warning, the court can begin to assess whether dismissal of the noncompliant absentees is warranted. First, the court should consider whether the action is an opt-in class action or an opt-out class action. 412 Generally, courts should dismiss opt-out members without prejudice and dismiss opt-in members with prejudice. As the Hernandez court explained, an absentee's failure to respond demonstrates greater bad faith in an opt-in class action than in an opt-out class action. 413 In an opt-in class action, the members have affirmatively shown interest in the action and thus are more like real parties. 414 Accordingly, when opt-in members fail to respond (assuming receipt of the discovery request), they are willfully ignoring the request. 415 Such ignorance is grounds for a court to make a finding of bad faith. 416 By contrast, an opt-out member's nonresponse could indicate either a lack of interest, nonreceipt of the request, 417 or willful bad faith. It is difficult for a court to discern which of the three motivations underlies an opt-out member's nonresponse. Accordingly, a court should not generally impose the harshest sanction on opt-out members, but should instead dismiss opt-out members without prejudice.
Further, if an opt-out member's discovery request or warning letter is returned as undeliverable, the court should decline to dismiss that member. 418 As the Cruz court explained, members who do not receive a final warning letter do not receive a final opportunity to respond. 419 Similarly, members who do not receive an initial discovery request are never informed that their participation was required. Because these members never received such notice, it would be a violation of their due process rights to dismiss them. 420 Next, the court should consider the degree of prejudice that the defendant has suffered due to the absentees' nonresponse. 421 Because courts should order absentee discovery only where the information is necessary to the defendant's claims or defenses, 422 nonresponse will usually result in great prejudice to the defendant. If the discovery is necessary, there are grounds for harsher sanctions. 423 Accordingly, if the defendant is greatly prejudiced, a court can consider ordering dismissal with prejudice. 424 However, courts should be more reluctant to order dismissal with prejudice in an opt-out class action, because it is usually unclear whether the absentees have acted in bad faith. 425 Finally, if the action is an opt-in class action, the court should take into account the level of bad faith on the part of the absent members, as the Hernandez court did. 426 Courts should analyze the level of the absentees' bad faith by considering how many warnings the absent members have ignored and for how long they have ignored them. 427 If the opt-in absentees have ignored multiple warnings and/or not complied for a long period of time, the court should order dismissal with prejudice. 428 As part of the first step of this solution, the court will have already sent at least one warning. 429 Failure to respond to this warning and any subsequent warnings (assuming the warnings were received), demonstrates bad faith on the part of the absent members. 430 Because evidence of bad faith is often difficult to establish in opt-out class actions, dismissal with prejudice generally will not be warranted in such actions. In opt-out class actions, it is difficult to discern the motivation behind an absentee's nonresponse. 431 Accordingly, courts will often be unable to assess whether such members have acted in bad faith at all. 432 Given that evidence of bad faith is necessary for dismissal with prejudice, 433 courts should not dismiss opt-out members with prejudice.
To summarize, noncompliant absentees in opt-out actions should usually be dismissed without prejudice, and noncompliant absentees in opt-in actions should usually be dismissed with prejudice. 434 However, a court can impose a harsher sanction on opt-out absentees if the defendant has been severely prejudiced by those absentees' failure to respond. 435 If the action is an opt-in class action and the absentees have acted with a high level of bad faith, the court should order dismissal with prejudice. 436 
C. Problems with the Hernandez/Cruz Solution
Absent members will argue that this solution undercuts the accepted passive role of absent members, 437 creates an opt-in action for opt-out members, 438 and gives defendants a tactical mechanism with which to eliminate class members. 439 Class action advocates will argue that this solution undermines the efficiency of class actions because it does not lead to a defendant obtaining a bill of peace. 440 This Note discusses and rebuts each argument, in turn.
First, opponents will argue that dismissing absentees distorts the passive role that the Supreme Court has envisioned for absent members. 441 Absentees will argue that creating a choice between response and dismissal forces them to be active in a class action. 442 However, any sanction lesser than dismissal will not meaningfully ameliorate the prejudice that the defendant has suffered from nonresponse. 443 As previously discussed, discovery requests should be propounded only when the information is necessary to the defendant's claims or defenses. 444 It follows that the defendant suffers prejudice when the absentees fail to provide such necessary information. 445 Imposing a meaningful sanction is paramount when weighing the defendant's interest in the information against the members' interest in maintaining a passive role. 446 Monetary sanctions against class counsel, exclusion of new claims, or exclusion of the nonresponsive members' evidence will not ameliorate the defendant's prejudice. 447 Monetary sanctions against nonresponsive class members will not ameliorate the defendant's prejudice and are nearly impossible to collect. 448 These solutions do not cure the defendant's prejudice because the nonresponsive members are still included in the action. 449 On the other hand, an order of dismissal will meaningfully ameliorate a defendant's prejudice because the nonresponsive members causing the prejudice will be excluded from the action. 450 Second, absentees will argue that dismissing opt-out members without prejudice in Rule 23 class actions creates an opt-in action that undermines the efficiency of Rule 23. 451 Although dismissing opt-out members without prejudice undermines the efficiency of a particular case, 452 such dismissal will not undermine the efficiency of Rule 23 class actions as a whole. Discovery of absent members is rarely permitted because of the strict standards for such discovery, 453 and thus, absentee exclusion will be rare. 454 Therefore, class actions will remain an efficient mechanism that facilitates resolution of many similar claims.
Third, absent members will argue that permitting dismissal of absentees gives defendants a tactical tool that can potentially reduce class size. 455 This concern is unfounded because courts should deny any discovery request that is intended to decrease class size. 456 A court's initial analysis of whether to permit discovery will eliminate any tactical uses of absentee discovery. 457 Fourth, class action advocates will argue that ordering dismissal of optout absentees without prejudice deprives defendants of a "bill of peace." 458 When absentees are dismissed without prejudice, defendants could be subject to repetitive, individual suits. 459 However, concern for absentees' due process rights outweigh defendants' need for a bill of peace. As previously discussed, the motivation behind an opt-out member's nonresponse is unclear. 460 Because an opt-out absentee may not have received the discovery request, dismissal could be without notice to that absentee. 461 As such, absentee dismissal implicates due process concerns about notice and the right to be heard. 462 Dismissal without prejudice forestalls or ameliorates these due process problems because it allows an absentee to continue pursuing a claim. 463 The proposed solution has implications for the Rule 23(b)(3)(A) requirement that courts assess the class members' interest in individually controlling the prosecution of their claim. 464 Absentees may refuse to respond to a discovery request because they lack interest in the claims 465 or wish to bring their claims individually. 466 A lack of response may indicate that the absentees want to individually control the litigation and would prefer that a class action not be maintained on their behalf. Accordingly, if many absentees fail to respond to discovery requests, there may be grounds for a court to decertify a class. 467 
CONCLUSION
Courts are in disagreement about whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction when absentees fail to respond to postcertification discovery requests. This issue implicates due process concerns and raises questions about the role, rights, and duties of absent members. Courts should strive to impose a sanction that ameliorates the defendant's prejudice while recognizing absent members' due process rights.
Courts should dismiss nonresponsive absentees because dismissal is the only sanction that meaningfully ameliorates a defendant's prejudice. Courts can protect absentees' due process rights by issuing a warning of potential sanctions. Yet, when opt-out absentees fail to respond, it is difficult for courts to discern whether that nonresponse is in bad faith. Accordingly, courts should generally dismiss nonresponsive opt-out members without prejudice. By contrast, because opt-in absentees have shown interest in the class action, their nonresponse is in bad faith. Therefore, courts should generally dismiss nonresponsive opt-in members with prejudice.
